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PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS: THE
INTERACTION OF SECTION 9-301(2) OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE AND SECTION 547 OF THE.
BANKRUPTCY ACT

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981 the North Dakota Legislature amended section 41-09
-22(2) of the Century Code1 to provide a secured party with twenty
days to perfect a purchase money security interest.2 Prior to this
amendment the perfection period was ten days. 3 The perfection
period under the uniform version of section 9-301(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code is ten days. 4 Secured creditors should
approach the extension of this time period for delayed perfection
with caution because the new Federal Bankruptcy Act permits only
a ten day grace period for the delayed filing of security interests. 5
This Note will examine the historical relationship between
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) and the
Bankruptcy Act. The interaction of section 9-301(2) and the
Bankruptcy Act in terms of preferential transfers will also be
explored. Finally, this Note will discuss the risks that face secured
creditors who rely on the new twenty day extension.
1. Act of March 11, 1981, ch. 432, § 1, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 1202 (codified at N.D. CENT.
Codes § 41-09-22(2) (Supp. 1981)). Section 41-09-22(2) is the North Dakota counterpart to § 9
-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-22(2) (Supp. 1981).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-22(2) (1969) (amended 1981).
4. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978).
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 STAT. 2549 (codified'at 11 U.S.C.
5 547(e)(2) (1979 & Supp. IV 1980)).
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INTERESTS:

PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS

Section 9-107 of the Code defines a purchase money security
interest. 6 A purchase money security interest is a special type of
security interest, which the Code broadly defines as an "interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation.' '7 Suppose, for example, that a
person, Debtor (D), wishes to borrow money from a bank. The
bank is willing to loan D the money, but it wants assurance that D
will repay the loan. If D does not repay the loan, the bank would
like something to replace the money owed to it. D may offer his car
to the bank as collateral8 for the loan and the bank will take a
security interest in D's car. If D defaults, the bank, which is now a
secured creditor, can foreclose or otherwise realize on the collateral
to satisfy its claim. 9
A purchase money security interest may arise in a similar
situation. Suppose D does not own a car, but wishes to buy one.
The bank may be willing to make a loan to D, but again it wants
collateral to secure the loan. Therefore, D will grant the bank a
security interest in his new car. Because the bank loaned D the
money to assist him in the purchase of the car, the bank has
acquired a purchase money security interest in the car.
Two types of purchase money security interests exist. The first
type is referred to as a "true" purchase money security interest. 10
This type occurs when the seller of a product retains a security
interest in the product. For example, if D purchases furniture from
a home furnishings store on credit the store will have a "true"
6. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978). Section 9-107 states that a security interest is:
[A] purchase money security interest to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the
seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by
making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
Id.
7. Id. §1-201(37).
8. Collateral is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) as "property subject to a
security interest, and includes accounts and chattel paper which have been sold." Id. §9-105(c).
9. Id. § 9-501(1). Section 9-501(1) provides that if "a debtor is in default under a security
agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this Part.... He may reduce his
claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial
procedure." Id. See § 9-501 to 9-507 for the Code provisions concerning default.
10. Id. § 9-107(a). Section 9-107(a) defines a true purchase money security interest as a security
interest that is "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price." Id.
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purchase money security interest in the furniture.
The second type is an "enabling" purchase money security
interest. I This term describes a transaction in which a lender lends
money to the debtor to enable the debtor to purchase property. For
example, an enabling purchase money security interest arose when
D purchased his new car with the money he borrowed from the
bank. Section 9-107(b) of the Code lists the following three
requirements for an enabling purchase money security interest:
First, the lender must give value by making advances or incurring
an obligation; 12 second, the value must have been given to enable
the debtor to buy the collateral; and third, the value must have
been used to buy the collateral.13

B.

CREATION OF A SECURITY INTEREST

A security interest does not magically appear. Creditors must
take certain steps to create an Article 9 security interest, which
includes a purchase money security interest. Section 9-203 of the
Code lists the necessary steps. 14

First, the creditor must enter into an agreement with the
debtor. This agreement must be in writing and be signed by the
debtor. 15 If the collateral is in the prossession of the secured party,
however, the agreement need not be in writing. 16 Second, the
debtor must have rights in the collateral. Third, the secured party
must give value. Once these events occur, a security interest exists
11. Id. § 9-107(b). An enabling purchase money security interest is defined as a security interest
"taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral ifsuch value is in fact so used." Id.
12. The value required by § 9-107(b) must be current or present value. This requirement
"excludes from the purchase money category any security interest taken as security for or in
satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt." Id. § 9-107, Comment 2.
13. Id. § 9-107(b).
14. Id.§ 9-203. Subsection 9-203(1) states in part:
[A] security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect
to the collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement,
or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral... ;
(b) value has been given;
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
Id.
15. This agreement is referred to as a security agreement. A security agreement "means an
agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." Id. § 9-105(1) (0.
16. Id. § 9-203(1)(a). The requirement of a written agreement is intended to reduce the
possibility of disputes concerning the terms of the security agreement and the collateral. When the
secured party possesses the collateral there is less need for this written evidence. Id. § 9-203,
Comment 3.
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and "attaches" to the collateral. 17
Attachment of the security interest is important to a secured
creditor because without attachment, the creditor's security
18
interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties.
Suppose, for example, that when D purchased the new car he did
not sign the security agreement. If D defaults on the loan, the bank
cannot foreclose pursuant to the agreement because the security
interest is not enforceable against D. Moreover, the bank cannot
enforce the security interest against third party creditors claiming a
security interest in D's car.
C.

PERFECTION OF A SECURITY INTEREST

Attachment alone, however, does not protect the secured
creditor from all third party claims to the collateral. The secured
creditor must "perfect" his security interest. 19 If the secured party
merely has created an enforceable security interest without
perfecting it, he may be in no better position than a general
unsecured creditor. Perfection affords a secured creditor with the
maximum protection against third parties. 20 Perfection of a
security interest occurs once the interest attaches to the property
and the secured party completes all the steps necessary for

perfection. 21
The most common method of perfection is filing a financing
statement. 22 A financing statement gives notice to third parties that
a secured party may claim a security interest in the collateral
described in the statement. The financing statement must be signed

17. Id. § 9-203(2). Subsection 9-203(2) states that "[a] security interest attaches when it
becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as
all of the events specified in subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the
time of attaching." Id.
18. Id. § 9-203(1).
19. Id. § 9-303, Comment 1. Generally, a perfected security interest protects the secured
creditor from "creditors and transferees of the debtor and in particular against any representative of
creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor." Id.
20. See id. § 9-301(1). Subsection (1) of § 9-301 states in part that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in subsection (2), an unperfectedsecurity interest is subordinate to the rights of... a person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 9-303(1). Section 9-303(l) states:
A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable
steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are specified in Sections 9302, 9-304, 9-305, and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the security interest
attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches.
Id.
22. Id. § 9-302(1). Generally, a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest.
Section 9-302 lists those transactions exempt from the filing requirement. See id. § 9-302.

1983]

NOTE

by the debtor 23 and include the following information: (1) the
names of the parties, (2) the addresses of the parties, and (3) a
description of the collateral. 24 The financing statement must be
filed in the appropriate place to perfect the security interest.25
A second method of perfection is possession of the collateral by
the creditor. Possession may be used to perfect a security interest in
certain kinds of collateral and must be used to perfect a security
interest in other types of collateral.26
Some security interests are automatically perfected under the
Code upon attachment of the security interest. The most common
example of automatic perfection is a purchase money security
27
interest in consumer goods.
D.

PERFECTION OF A PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST

Under section 9-301(2) of the Code a secured creditor with a
purchase money security interest has ten days -after the debtor
28
receives possession of the collateral to file a financing statement.
This ten day period is referred to as a grace period, which enables
the secured creditor to cut off intervening interests of lien creditors
29
or bulk purchasers.
If the creditor files a financing statement within ten days after
the debtor receives possession of the collateral, the perfection date
"relates back" to the date the security interest became
23. Id. § 9-402(1). Section 9-402(1) states in part:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the
secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing
address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral.
Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 9-401. The appropriate place to file will depend upon the type of collateral and which
alternative of § 9-401(1) has been adopted in ajurisdiction. Id. § 9-401(1). North Dakota has adopted
the second alternative. See N.D. CErr. CODE § 41-09-40 (Supp. 1981).
26. U.C.C. §§ 9-304, 9-305.
27. Id. § 9-302(1)(d). Examples of other interests which are automatically perfected are
assignments of a beneficial interest, § 9-302(I)(c); assignments of accounts, § 9-302(1)(e); and
9 3
assignments for the benefit of creditors, § - 02(l)(g). Id. § 9-302(2)(c), (e), (g). Certain security
interests perfect automatically for a limited time. See id. § 9-304(4)-(5), 9-306(3).
28. Id. § 9-301(2). Subsection (2) of § 9-301 provides:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before
or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes
priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between
the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.

29. Id. § 9-301, Comment 5.
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enforceable. 30 As previously discussed,3 1 a security interest must
attach to the collateral before the interest is enforceable.
Attachment occurs when an agreement exists, value is given, and
the debtor has rights in the collateral. In the purchase money
security interest context, three dates must be viewed separately:
The date the agreement is made, the date the debtor receives
possession, and the date the security interest becomes enforceable.
In most cases the debtor does not have rights in the collateral until
he receives possession of the collateral. 32 In this situation, the date
of enforceability and the date of possession coincide.
Suppose a bank loans money to D on March 1 to enable D to
purchase equipment. On March 2 D receives possession of the
equipment. Another creditor of D, X, obtains a lien on the same
equipment on March 5. On March 10 the bank perfects its security
interest by filing an appropriate financing statement.
Under the general rule of section 9-301(1) (b) 33 of the Code,
the bank's security interest is subordinate to the rights of X,
because X became a lien creditor before the bank perfected its
security interest. Section 9-301(2), however, allows the perfection
date to relate back to the date the security interest became
enforceable. The enforceability date is March 2, because D did not
acquire rights in the collateral until this date. The perfection date is
March 10, the date the bank filed the financing statement. Because
the March 10 perfection date is within ten days of March 2, the
date D received possession of the collateral, the perfection relates
back to March 2. In this example, therefore, the bank's security
30. 4 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.49(6), at 547-154 (15th ed. 1982).
31. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32. The Code does not specify when a debtor obtains rights in the collateral. In some situations,
a security interest may be effective based on property which the debtor does not yet possess. For
example, the floating lien provision of § 9-204 states that "a security agreement may provide that
any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral." U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1978). In other cases possession by the debtor of goods owned by a
third person is insufficient. See Disch v. Raven Transfer & Storage Co., 17 Wash. App. 73, 561 P.2d
1097 (Ct. App. 1977) (tenant in furnished house has no power to pledge furnishings).
Professors White and Summers have noted:
[lJudges do not often mechanically apply the phrase "rights in the collateral." Nor do
they mechanically determine when those rights arise. Rather, equities between
competing claimants may be fought out in the name of this phrase. And the time when
a court determines that the debtor acquired rights in the collateral may not only
depend on such equities, but also on the nature of the competing parties and the kind
oflaw involved.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 917 (2d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
33. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1978). According to § 9-301(l)(b) "an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of. . . a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected." Id.
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interest has priority over the interest of X even though the rights of
X arose during the time the bank was unperfected.
E.

SECURITY INTERESTS AND BANKRUPTCY

A creditor who creates an enforceable security interest and
who properly perfects the interest may have'-one additional hurdle
to face: bankruptcy of the debtor. The strength of a secured
creditor's position in bankruptcy is contingent upon the validity of
his security interest in relation to the various powers granted to the
bankruptcy trustee. 34 In a bankruptcy liquidation proceeding, the
debtor must turn his nonexempt assets over to the trustee. 35 The
trustee is also empowered to retrieve certain assets of the debtor,
which the debtor preferentially transferred on the eve of
bankruptcy. 3 6 The trustee in turn sells these assets and applies the
proceeds pro rata to the claims of unsecured creditors. 3 7
Because the trustee's duty is to collect property of the
bankrupt's estate, 38 the trustee is motivated to invalidate an Article
9 security interest. To the extent the trustee is successful, the estate
is increased and therefore, the potential amount distributable to
unsecured creditors is also increased.
A bankruptcy trustee succeeds both to the property rights of
the debtor and the defenses available to the debtor against third
parties. 39 In a previous example, the bank's security interest was
unenforceable because D did not sign the security agreement.
Because the trustee "steps into the legal shoes" of the debtor, the
trustee is also able to assert the debtor's claim of unenforceability.
As a result, the creditor is deprived of the collateral.
A trustee may also deprive a secured creditor of collateral in
which an enforceable but unperfected security interest exists.
Under the Bankruptcy Act the trustee receives all the rights under
state law of a hypothetical creditor with a lien on the debtor's
property. 40 The trustee's rights as a hypothetical lien creditor begin
34. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 918. Professors White and Summers state that "a
secured party who perfects prior to bankruptcy is likely to have the right to snatch the collateral out
of the trustee's hands, but an unperfected secured party will invariabily have to eat from the general
creditors' trough in bankruptcy." Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. 5 542 (Supp. IV 1980).
36. Id. §§ 541-548.
37. Id. §726.
38. Id. §704.
39. Id. 541(e).
40. Id. 544(a). Section 544(a) states in part:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
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on the date that the bankruptcy petition is filed. 41 For purposes of
this discussion the relevant state law is Article 9.42 As an example,
assume that on May 1 a bank has an enforceable, but unperfected,
nonpurchase money security interest. The debtor files a petition in
bankruptcy onJune 22.
Under section 9-301(1) (b) of the Code, the bank's interest can
be cut off by a creditor who obtains a lien on the collateral while the
bank is unperfected. The Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee the same
rights as this lien creditor. Therefore, the trustee may assert the
rights of a hypothetical lien creditor under section 9-301(1) (b) and
prevail over the bank. In this example this result is possible not only
because of the Bankruptcy Act, but also because the Code, in
section 9-301(3), defines a lien creditor to include a bankruptcy
trustee. 43
One situation exists, however, in which the creditor, though
unperfected at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, may be able
to achieve priority over the trustee despite the trustee's rights as a
hypothetical lien creditor. Suppose that a secured creditor makes a
purchase money loan to the debtor on May 1. The debtor files a
bankruptcy petition on May 4 and the creditor perfects by filing on
May 7. Under the ten day grace period of section 9-301(2) the
creditor's perfection of the security interest will relate back to May
1. The creditor would take priority over a lien creditor whose
interests intervene between the taking of a security interest and the
filing of the financing statement. Because the trustee has only the
rights that a lien creditor would have under state law as of the date
of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee loses in this example also.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the trustee's powers is
the ability to invalidate as preferential a security interest that is
fully enforceable and protected under state law. A secured creditor
with an enforceable and perfected security interest must exercise

avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable by (1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of
the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien
on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained ajudicial
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;

Id.
41. Id.
42. U.C.C. art. 9 (1978). Article 9 has been adopted by every state except Louisiana. U.C.C., I
U.L.A. 1, 2 (Supp. 1983).
43. U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1978). According to 9 9-301(3) a lien creditor includes "a trustee in
bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition." Id.
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caution in this preferential transfer area. A trustee is granted the
power to avoid transfers of the debtor to creditors that are
"preferential". 44 Moreover, a debtor's granting of a security
interest is a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. 45
This power is based on two policies. 46 First, the debtor should treat
creditors equally. 4 7 This policy allows the trustee to reach transfers
made within a certain time before bankruptcy. Second, because
secret liens should be discouraged, a creditor should not delay
perfecting a security interest in the debtor's collateral. 48 Perfection,
through a filed financing statement, serves as notice that the
creditor may claim an interest in the collateral. Therefore, to avoid
any public record of his security interest the creditor could delay
filing until notice of bankruptcy. While this tactic is still possible,
the avoidance powers of the trustee make it less appealing because
the trustee's powers enable him to avoid preferential transfers made
within a certain time before bankruptcy.
III.

THE TIMING OF PERFECTION
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938
A. A

BRIEF

HISTORY

OF

ARTICLE

9

UNDER

OF

THE

COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF

THE

UNIFORM

1938

One of the primary purposes of Article 9 is to provide a unified
structure for modern secured financing transactions. 4 9 Prior to the
enactment of Article 9, the law of secured transactions was complex
and unclear. 50 The results of these ambiguities were increased costs
to both parties and increased uncertainty as to their rights and the
rights of third parties dealing with them. 51 Article 9, however, was
not the panacea envisioned by its drafters. The enactment of
Article 9 dated the preference provisions of the 1938 Bankruptcy
Act. 52 Inconsistencies between the Code and the Bankruptcy Act
44. 11 U.S.C. §547 (Supp. IV 1980).
45. Id. § 101(40) (Supp. IV 1980). Subsection 101(40) states that a transfer "means every mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." Id.
46. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 999.
47. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 999.
48. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 999-1000.
49. U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment (1978).
50. Id. The comment to section 9-101 points out that pre-Code law was baffling. For example

"it was by no means clear, even to specialists, how under pre-Code law a security interest might be
taken in many kinds of intangible property -

such as television or motion picture rights -

which

have come to be an important source of commercial collateral." Id.
51. Id.
52. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTcY ACT AND THE UNIFORM
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promoted the National Bankruptcy Conference to establish a
committee in 1966 to coordinate the two statutes. 53 The report of
the "Gilmore Committee" 54 urged a revision of the Bankruptcy
Act. 55 One of the primary aims of the committee was to coordinate

the section 60 preference provisions of the 1938 Bankruptcy Act
with Article 9.56 To meet these goals Congress enacted 57the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, which took effect on October 1, 1979.

Generally the unified procedures of Article 9 have successfully
allowed a creditor to obtain a security interest enforceable against
both the debtor and third party claimants. Prior to 1978, however,
certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Act became important to the
creditor if his debtor declared bankruptcy. The preference
provisions of section 6058 had particular significance. Section 60
invalidated preferential transfers from the debtor to favored
creditors before bankruptcy.
B.

SECTION

60

OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF

1938

The key provision of section 60 was subsection (a)(1) which
defined a preferential transfer. 59 To attack a transfer as a voidable
COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6164, 6167 [hereinafter cited as GILMORE REPORT]. The report more specifically
stated:
In 1966 it appeared that security interests in personal property under Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code were in serious jeopardy in bankruptcy proceedings.
At the time when the revision of § 60 [of the Bankruptcy Act] which was enacted in
1950 was being prepared, the drafting of Article 9 was in its early stages. The § 60
revision, of necessity, was written in what we may call pre-Code language .... If the
structure of security law had remained as it was, the compromise represented by the
1950 revision of§ 60 would have worked perfectly well. With the general enactment of
the Code, including Article 9, the situation was radically altered. Arguably, Article 9
contained little or nothing that was revolutionary, or even novel, as a matter of
substance. The Article 9 terminology, on the other hand, represented a sharp break
with the past. The difficulty of making the two statutes (§ 60 and Article 9) mesh or
track with each other was immediately apparent.
Id. at 6167.
53. Id. at 6164.
54. The committee is commonly referred to as the "Gilmore Committee" because its chairman
was Professor Grant Gilmore.
55. See generally GILMORE REPORT, supranote 52, at 6164-70.
56. GILMORE REPORT, supra note 52, at 6166. The Committee report states that "[s]o far as
human wit and intelligence can insure the outcome, the proposed revisions of § 60 and Article 9, if
they succeed in winning enactment, should be able to coexist comfortably." Id.
57. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV, 92 Stat. 2682 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151326)(Supp. IV 1980).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. IV 1980)). See also 11
U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §5 541(e), 544(a) (Supp. IV 1980)). Section
110 (c) gave the trustee the status of an "ideal lien creditor" as of the date of bankruptcy. This status
enabled the trustee to defeat an unperfected security interest because under section 9-301(b) a lien
creditor defeats a party with an unperfected interest. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 994 n. 10.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. IV 1980)). Section
60(a)(1) defined a preference as:
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preference, the trustee was required to prove the following
elements: (1) a transfer of the debtor's property to a creditor, (2) for
an antecedent debt, (3) while the debtor was insolvent, (4) within
four months before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and (5) at
a time when the creditor knew or had reason to know that the
debtor was insolvent. 60 The issues become whether the transfer
occurred within four months of bankruptcy, whether the transfer
was for an antecedent debt, and whether the debtor was insolvent
when the transfer took place. 61 To resolve these issues it was
necessary to determine when the transfer occurred. The
disharmony between Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act produced
problems in this area.
The Bankruptcy Act established a test for determining when
the transfer was deemed to have occurred. 62 If under applicable
state law, a party was given twenty-one days or less after the
transfer to record or deliver, and the party did so within the grace
period, the transfer was deemed to have occurred at the time of the
actual transfer. If the applicable state law specified either no grace
period or a period greater than twenty-one days, but a party acted
within twenty-one days, the transfer was deemed to have occurred
at the time of the actual transfer. This timing provision was
referred to as Paragraph 1.63 If the party recorded after twenty-one
days, the transfer was deemed to have occurred at the time the
64
party recorded his security interests.
[A] transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the
benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor
of the same class.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Mann & Phillips, The Timing of Perfection of Security Interests Under the Uniform CommercialCode
andthe Bankruptcy Reform Act, 15 AKRON L. REv. 369, 372 (1981).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)(I), (II). Paragraph I provided:
Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more than
twenty-one days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or some other act
is required, and compliance therewith is had within such stated period of time; or
where (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time or where such
stated period of time is more than twenty-one days, and compliance therewith is had
within twenty-one days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or
suffered at the time of transfer.
Id.
Paragraph II provided that "[w]here compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph I . . . the transfer shall be deemed to be made or
suffered at the time of compliance therewith." Id.
63. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 372.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)(II) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. IV 1980)).
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The following example illustrates the operation of Paragraph
I. On March 1 D grants the bank a security interest in equipment
that D presently owns to secure a loan. On March 23 the bank
perfects the security interest. On April 25 D files a petition in
bankruptcy.
Because the bank acted more than twenty-one days after the
original transfer, the Bankruptcy Act would deem the March 23
perfection date to be the date of transfer. Therefore, under
Paragraph I the transfer from the debtor to the creditor occurred on
March 23.
By applying Paragraph I the trustee may possibly avoid the
transaction. Because the debt arose on March 1 and the transfer
occurred on March 23, the transfer of the security interest on
March 23 was for a previously existing debt. In the language of the
Bankruptcy Act, this was a transfer "for or on account of an
antecedent debt." ' 65 If the trustee is able to establish the other
elements of a preferential transfer, this transaction is voidable.
To apply the twenty-one day timing provision, Paragraph I
required a reference to state law. The language of Paragraph I,
however, presented no serious problem when applied to customary
filing-type statutes under pre-Code law. 66 Typically these statutes
provided a grace period within which the filing party was to act. 67 If
the state statute provided a grace period of twenty-one days or less,
the state statute controlled. 6 8 If the state statute provided either a
grace period of more than twenty-one days or none at all, the
69
Bankruptcy Act provided a twenty-one day grace period.
Therefore, if the secured party perfected within the applicable
grace period, the time of the transfer for bankruptcy purposes was
the time of the actual transfer.
Although no serious problems existed under pre-Code law, the
same was not true under Code law. A severe problem developed
when the applicable state law was the Uniform Commercial Code.
Article 9 of the Code provides no grace period for perfecting a
security interest. 70 The language of Paragraph I, however, suggests
that the drafters assumed a statutory grace period. 71 Therefore, an
65. Id. § 96(a)(1).
66. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.8, at 1326 (1965).
67. Id. Professor Gilmore notes that sometimes the grace period was a specified number of days,
but other times it was merely a "reasonable time." Id. Under the "reasonable time" formula, the
grace period was left to judicial decision. Id.
68. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 373.
69. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 373.
70. The exception to the no grace period rule is a purchase money security interest. U.C.C. § 9301(2) (1978). See supranotes 28-33 and accompanying text for a discussion ofsection 9-301(2).
71. GILMORE REPORT, supra note 52, at 6170.
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issue arose whether a secured party under Article 9 had a twentyone day grace period for perfecting the security interest.
Commentators generally concluded that the twenty-one day grace
period was appropriate. 72 The application of this grace period,
however, allowed a lien creditor, but not the bankruptcy trustee, to
defeat the non-purchase money secured party. Professor Lawrence
King described the situation as follows:
Assume a loan is made and a security agreement is
entered into on January 2, but that the financing
statement which is required for full perfection is not filed
until January 20. The debtor files a petition in
bankruptcy on May 15. If there had been a creditor who
obtained a judgment lien on the collateral between
January 2 and January 20, by application of Section 9301 [(1) (b)] the judgment creditor would clearly prevail
over the secured creditor. The result is not so certain
under the Bankruptcy Act. Most authorities take the
position that the trustee cannot set aside the security
interest when the financing statement has been filed
within twenty-one days after the security interest was
granted. Under section 60(a) (7) (I) (B), therefore, the
transfer must be deemed made for a contemporaneous
consideration on January 2, more than four months
3
before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.1
A potential solution to this problem was to interpret section 9
-301(1) of the Code as giving a specified period of zero days, no
grace period, in which to perfect a security interest. 74 Professor
King further illustrated:
If. . . the grace period is inapplicable, the transfer
must be deemed made on January 20. Two crucial
elements of a voidable preference could therefore be
proven: (1) the date of filing, May 15, is within four
72. G.
SECURED

GILMORE,

supra note 66, at 1327. See also 1A P.

TRANSACTIONS

[hereinafter cited

UNDER

THE

UNIFORM

COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS,

COMMERCIAL

CODE,

9

9.03(5)(c),

995 (1963)

as COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS].

73. King, Voidable Preferences andthe Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 925, 929 (1967).
74. G. GILMORE, supra note 66, at 1327-28. Professor Gilmore concluded:
If the underlying policy of § 60(a)(7) is thought to be the adoption of any state filing
requirement which is shorter than the 21-day maximum, it would be entirely possible
to conclude that any filing delay after the security interest had attached would make
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months of the transfer; and (2) since no consideration
passed on January 20, the transfer was for an antecedent
debt. (The other elements comprise fact questions not
material to the present discussion.) It seems clear that the
result in bankruptcy proceedings would differ from that
under the Code only if the twenty-one day grace period is
applicable. To the extent that the results do differ, the
Bankruptcy Act fails to make the trustee a hypothetical
judicial lien creditor under applicable state law. 75
Either solution posed problems. If the twenty-one day grace
period was found applicable, the Bankruptcy Act violated the
Article 9 policy of encouraging advance or immediate filing of nonpurchase money security interest. 76 In addition, the result reached
in a bankruptcy proceeding would differ from that reached in a
non-bankruptcy proceeding. If section 9-301 of the Code was
viewed as giving a specified period of zero days, the Code violated
the bankruptcy provision policy of allowing the secured party a
reasonable amount of time to perfect the transfer. 77
C.

SECTION

60 AND

PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS

A greater problem arose when the timing provision of
Paragraph I was applied to purchase money security interests.
Purchase money security interests are granted a ten day grace
period by the Code. 78 If the purchase money secured creditor files
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral,
the date of filing "relates back" to the date the security interest
attached. The delayed filing operates to cut off the rights of any
intervening lien creditors or bulk purchasers. 79 The grace period
reflects the intent of the Code drafters to favor purchase money
8
security interests. 0
Because section 9-301(2) provides a stated period of ten days
the transaction a transfer for an antecedent debt under § 60(a)(7). The language of
§ 60(a)(7) is that the filing must be made within whatever "stated period," less than
21 days, may be "specified" in the "applicable law." Article 9 could be taken as a
statute which specifies a stated period of zero days.

Id.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

King, supra note 73, at 929.
King, supra note 73, at 929.
King, supra note 73, at 928.
U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978).
Id.

80. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 1043. Generally, the three reasons for the priority given
to purchase money security interests are as follows: (1) purchase money lenders enjoyed priority
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for a secured party to act, the creditor would have a ten day grace
period under Paragraph 1.81 If the non-purchase money secured
party received the twenty-one day grace period under Paragraph I,
the purchase money secured party received a shorter grace
period.8 2 Obviously this result did not advance the Code policy of
preferring purchase money security interests. Moreover, the result
reached in a bankruptcy proceeding differed from that reached
outside bankruptcy. Section 9-301(2), through the relation-back
provision, allowed a purchase money secured party to defeat a lien
creditor or bulk purchaser outside bankruptcy. In bankruptcy,
however, the purchase money secured party would receive a
shorter grace period than would a nonpurchase money secured
party.
The following example illustrates this problem. On May 1 D
grants the bank a security interest in equipment. D has possession
of the equipment on May 1 and the security interest also attaches
on this date. On May 25 D files a petition in bankruptcy. Assuming
the bank has a purchase money security interest, it must perfect its
security interest no later than May 11. If perfection occurs later
than May l Ithe trustee in bankruptcy may avoid the transaction as
a preferential transfer.
If, however, the bank has a nonpurchase money security
interest, the bank may wait until May 22 to perfect the interest.
This inconsistent result was possible because in bankruptcy the
purchase money secured party would receive only a ten day grace
period while a nonpurchase money secured party would receive
the Paragraph I twenty-one day grace period.
Two solutions were posed, which attempted to eliminate the
disparity. The first solution was to interpret Paragraph I as also
applying the twenty-one day grace period to purchase money
security interests.8 3 This approach, however, took certain liberties
under pre-Code law; (2) it should not be necessary for a seller to examine the filings to sustain his

priority over goods he himself owns; and (3) purchase money provisions enable the debtor to receive
greater credit and bargaining power. Id.

81. G. GILMORF, supra note 66, at 1328-29. Another interpretative issue is at what moment does
the grace period begin. Paragraph I merely stated that the grace period exists for "twenty-one days
after the transfer." 11 U.S.C. S 96(a)(7)(I) (emphasis added). Section 9-301(2) states that the grace
period exists for "ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral." U.C.C. 5 9-301(2)
(emphasis added). For further discussion ofwhen the grace period begins, see infra note 84.
82. G. GILMORF, supra note 66, at 1328. Professor Gilmore noted that "[t]his is an obviously
anomalous result since the purchase-money party, who is singled out for favored treatment under
Article 9, gets the axe under § 60(a)(7) 11 days sooner than his non-purchase-money competitor."

Id.
83. COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS, supra note 72, § 9.03(5)(c), at 995. Professor Gilmore also
commented on this suggestion:
The anomaly can be avoided by saying that, despite the "stated period" of § 9-301(2),
the holder of a purchase-money interest, like the holder of any other interest, should
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with the interpretation of section 9-301(2) of the Code and the
Bankruptcy Act. Section 9-301(2) clearly provides a ten day grace
84
period and Paragraph I obviously considered such a grace period.
The second alternative was to interpret section 9-301(1) as
providing a stated period of zero days for non-purchase money
security interests. 5 Under this approach, purchase money security
interests would still have the ten day grace period and would still
receive favored treatment. Nonpurchase money security interests,
however, would have no grace period. Yet, interpretative problems
still existed because section 9-301(1) mentions nothing about a
grace period of zero days.8 6 Furthermore, Paragraph I
contemplated situations in which state statutes were silent about
grace periods by providing the twenty-one day period. The
have the full 21 days. This suggestion has, indeed, been made, and by an eminently
respectable source, but there is some difficulty in squaring it with the (at this point)
quite precise language of § 60(a)(7). Or we can console ourselves with the thought that
anomalies are only to be expected when inconsistent statutory formulas must somehow
be made to work in double harness.
G. GILMORE, supra note 66, at 1328.

84. G. GILMORE, supra note 66, at 1328-29. Another difficulty is when the grace period begins.
Under section 9-301(2) the period dates from the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral
and not from the time of transfer, which is the date under the Bankruptcy Act. Compare 11 U.S.C.
S 96(a)(7)(I) with-.G.C 5 9-301(2). Commenting on the situation, Professor Gilmore offered the
following possibilities:
If "transfer" is translated into Article 9 terminology, the § 60(a)(7) period runs from
the date the security interest attaches. . . . In many purchase-money transactions,
attachment of the security interest and delivery of the collateral to the debtor will be
simultaneous. In such cases the § 60(a)(7) period and the § 9-301(2) period run from
the same point in time and there is no difficulty. If, however, there is a delay after
attachment and before delivery, we are all at once back in the familiar land of
anomaly. Are we to say that, for the purpose of § 60(a)(7), the purchase-money party
must file within 10 days from attachment ("transfer") even though his § 9-301(2)
grace period has not yet run? Or are we to say that, at least in such a case, § 9-301 does
not "specify" a "stated period" running from the date of transfer so that the
purchase-money party who delays delivery gets 21 days while the party who makes an
immediate delivery gets only 10 days? Perhaps the suggestion that all purchase-money
filing should have the benefit of the 21-day period can be reinforced by the observation
that § 9-301(2), read literally, does not specify a stated period running from the date of
transfer and therefore should not be held to cut back the full period in any case.
G. GILMORE, supra note 66, at 1328-29.
85. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 376.
86. King, supra note 73, at 932-33. Professor King indicated that the situation was not
insolvable:
fT]he problem is capable of a logical solution. The Bankruptcy Act defers to state law
for a determination of when a security interest is perfected, and the policy of the
Bankruptcy Act is to give the trustee in bankruptcy the same rights as judicial lien
creditors. Under state law there is no period of grace for perfecting non-purchasemoney security interests and there is a ten-day grace period for perfecting purchasemoney security interests. For purposes of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, the same
conclusions should be reached in a bankruptcy proceeding. Such an interpretation
does not derogate from the concept of federal supremacy over state, since the
Bankruptcy Act clearly refers to state law for application of the transfer test.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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problem, as noted by Professor Gilmore, was "not capable of a
logical solution: the courts may as well decide the case by rolling the
dice." ' 87 The only satisfactory answer was to change either the
88
Bankruptcy Act or Article 9 of the Code.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
A.

SECTION

547

PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS

The above problems were addressed by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act. Section 547, the successor of section 60, contains
substantial modifications.8 9 Many of the modifications were in
response to the problems created by the interaction of Article 9 of
the Code and the Bankruptcy Act.9 0
Section 547 defines preferential transfers and lists seven
elements the bankruptcy trustee must prove to establish a
preferential transfer. 91 First, a transfer is required. The.
Bankruptcy Act defines transfer to include the granting of a
87. G. GILMORE, supra note 66, at 1329.
88. GILMORE REPORT, supra note 52, at 6170. The Gilmore Committee urged a revision of the
Bankruptcy Act as follows:
Present § 60, as even its dearest friends will concede, is, as a matter of language,

intolerably and unnecessarily complex. Furthermore, as has already been pointed out,
present § 60 was, necessarily, written in pre-Code terminology, which leads to
difficult. indeed logically insoluble, problems of statutory construction in applying the
5 60 rules to Article 9 security interests. For example present § 60(a)(7) deals with the
problem of late filing of security interests subject to a filing perfection requirement.
The Article 9 filing system is quite different from the filing systems set up under the
pre-Code security statutes. For one thing, there is no grace period for filing under
Article 9. except for purchase money security interests which get a 10-day grace
period. Present § 60(a)(7) clearly assumes that all filing statutes have grace periods for
all required filings. Consequently no one really knows what §60(a)(7) means when it is
applied to Article 9 filings and. indeed, the commentators who have discussed the
point have proposed divergent and contradictory solutions.
Id.
89. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 378.
90. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787, 5873. The Committee notes state that "[tihis section [§ 547] is a substantial modification of
present law. It modernizes the preference provisions and brings them more into conformity with
commercial practice and the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 5873.
91. 11 U.S.C. 5 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 547(b) defines a preferential transfer as
follows:
[A preferential transfer is] any transfer of property of the debtor (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was
made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such creditor, at the time of such transfer (i) was an insider; and
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security interest. 92 Second, a transfer of the debtor's property must
occur. Third, the transfer must be to or for the benefit of a creditor.
Fourth, the transfer must be for a previously existing debt. Fifth,
the transfer must occur while the debtor is insolvent. A statutory
presumption aids the trustee in proving this element. Under section
547() the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent for ninety days
prior to bankruptcy.93 The sixth element places a time limit on the
trustee's ability to reach transfers. Only transfers made within
ninety days or one year are vulnerable. 94 If the transfer was made
to an insider, 95 the trustee may avoid the transfer if it was made
during the period that begins one year before the filing of the
petition and ends ninety days before the filing. 96 If the transfer was
made to any other creditor the period is ninety days before
bankruptcy.9 7 There is no requirement that the antecedent debt
arise during these periods, only that the "transfer" occur within
the period.9 8 Seventh, the transfer must enable the creditor to
receive more than he would have under a liquidation proceeding. 99
If the trustee establishes these elements, he may avoid the transfer.
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time
ofsuch transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions ofthis title.
Id.

92. Id. § 101(40).
93. Id. S 547(0. Section 547(0 states that "the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and
during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition." Id.
94. Id. § 547(b)(4).
95. Id. § 101(25). The term insider is defined by § 101(25) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. Generally,
an insider is "one who has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made
subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arms length with the debtor." S. REP. No. 989, supra
note 90, at 25, U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws at 5810. The insider must also have had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii)
(Supp. IV 1980).
96. 11 U.S.C. §547(b)(4)(B).
97. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
98. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 90, at 87, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5873.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). The trustee must prove that the transfer enabled the
creditor to receive more than he would have if the case were a liquidation case, if the transfer had not
been made and if the creditor received payment to the extent provided by the provisions of the Code.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 90, at 87, U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5873. Under § 60(a)(1) the
trustee was required to prove that the transfer enabled the creditor to "obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class." 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (repealed 1978).
Thus, all creditors of the same class had to receive an equal percentage of their claims or the transfer
would be preferential. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 1004 n.43. Under § 60(a)(1) the transfer
could possibly escape the trustee's avoidance powers if all creditors within a class received equal
percentages or if the creditor was the only member ofhis class, even though the paid creditor was in a
class of lower priority than another class of unpaid creditors. Young, Code Preferences, 54 AM. BANKR.
L. J. 221, 224 (1980). The Bankruptcy Reform Act now requires the court to focus on the relative
distribution between different classes as well as the amount received by members of the same class. S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 90, at 87, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5873. The new Act also
requires a consideration of the allowability of the creditor's claim. Under old 5 60(a)(1) ifa creditor's
claim was disallowed, a transfer to this creditor would probably not have been preferential because
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Under section 547 the time a transfer occurs is important. This
date is necessary for determining the presence of an antecedent
debt, 100 insolvency,101 and the ninety day or one year
vulnerability period. 10 2 Although section 60 provided a twentyone day grace period, section 547(e)(2) changes the grace period to
ten days. 10 3 The grace period in the new Bankruptcy Act applies to
all transfers, without regard to any grace period provided by state
law. 104 Thus, section 547 resolves one of the problems created by
the interaction of Article 9 with section 60: whether the secured
party had a grace period within which to perfect his security
interest.
B.

THE TIMING OF TRANSFERS UNDER SECTION

547

Section 547(e) (2) provides three timing provisions. 10 5 First, if
a transfer is perfected within ten days of attachment of the security
interest, the date of attachment is the date of transfer. 10 6 This
"the holder of a disallowed claim belongs to no actual class in the bankruptcy proceedings" and
therefore this creditor did not receive a greater percentage than others of the same class. Young,
supra, at 224-25. Section 547(b)(5) of the new Act would declare a disallowed claim a voidable
preference. A creditor with a disallowed claim would have received nothing under the distributive
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and therefore the transfer enabled the creditor to receive more than
he would have in a chapter 7 liquidation. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 90, at 87, U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. Naws at 5873.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
101. Id. § 547(b)(3).
102. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A), (B).
103. Id. § 547(e)(2).
104. Hogan, Bankruptcy Reforn and Delayed Filing Under the U. C. C., 35 ARK. L. REv. 35, 46-47
(1981). Reference to state law is still necessary to determine what acts constitute perfection. See 4 W.
COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.46(1), at 547-136 (15th ed. 1982).
105. 11 U.S.C. 5 547(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Subsection 547(e)(2) states that a transfer is
made:
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the
transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such
10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is
not perfected at the later of(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor'and
the transferee.
Id.
106. Section 547(e)(2) uses the phrase "at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A). This phrase is commonly interpreted to
mean the date the security interest became enforceable and attached to the collateral. GILMORE
REPORT, supra note 52, at 6173. The Gilmore Report further explained the phrase:
A final word should be said about the phrase "became effective between the
parties" which is used in the Draft in lieu of the Article 9 term "attached." It is
believed that the reference to the time when a transfer becomes effective between the
parties (but not, necessarily, against third parties) is one that will be generally
understood by lawyers, no matter what kind of transfer is involved. The use of the
technical Article 9 term "attached" might have caused difficulty with respect to
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section operates similarly to the "relation-back" provision of the
Code. Second, if perfection occurs more than ten days after
attachment, the date of perfection is the date of transfer. 10 7 Third,
if no perfection has occurred on the date of bankruptcy, the transfer
is deemed to occur immediately before bankruptcy. 108
The Bankruptcy Act and the Code are still greatly interrelated
because state law determines what acts constitute perfection.
Article 9 of the Code provides the relevant rules in forty-nine
states. 10 9 The Bankruptcy Act, however, provides the definition of
perfection. Suppose a creditor wishes to perfect his security
interest. To determine what actions are necessary the creditor must
examine Article 9. The creditor generally will need to file a
financing statement. 10° If the creditor wishes to determine whether
the interest is perfected in bankruptcy, however, he must look to
the Bankruptcy Act.
Under the Bankruptcy Act a transfer of personal property or
fixtures is perfected when it is effective against a creditor with a
judicial lien."' For transfers of security interests in personal
property, filing is usually necessary.1 1 2 For example, D grants the
bank a security interest in equipment to secure a loan. Unless the
bank files a financing statement, the bank's security interest is
unperfected. If X obtains a judicial lien on D's equipment, X will
have an interest superior to the bank's interest. Under the
Bankruptcy Act, the bank's interest is not perfected because it is
not effective against X, a judicial lien creditor.1 1 3 Therefore, the
trustee may avoid the transaction, /
The following example illustrates the operation of the ten day
period of section 547(e) (2). Assume on July 1 D grants the bank a
security interest in equipment that D owns to secure a loan. On
July 9 the bank perfects its security interest by appropriately filing a
financing statement. D files a petition in bankruptcy on July 30,
transfers other than Article 9 security interests. Indeed "becomes effective between the
parties" is what "attached" means in the Article 9 context - a point which is spelled
out in the proposed revision of Article 9 which is currently under study by the Article 9
Review Committee.
Id.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B).
108. Id. § 547(e)(2)(C).
109. U.C.C., 1 U.L.A. 1, 2 (Supp. 1983). Louisiana is the only state which has not adopted
Article 9. Id.
110. SeeU.C.C. § 9-302, § 9-302, Comment 1 (1978).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 547(e)(1)(B) states that a "transfer of a
fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot
acquire ajudicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee." Id.
112. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1) (1978).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
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within ninety days of the transfer.
Under section 547(e)(2), the transfer is deemed to occur on
July 1 because perfection occurred on July 9, within ten days of the
114
date on which the security interest became enforceable.
Therefore, the trustee may not avoid the bank's security interest.
No antecedent debt exists because the debt arose on July 1 and the
transfer is deemed to occur on the same day. If, however, the
creditor did not perfect its security interest untilJuly 12, the time of
transfer is July 12 because this date is more than ten days after the
July 1 enforceability date. 1 15 In this case the trustee would establish
the antecedent debt requirement because the debt arose prior to the
July 12 time of transfer.
Section 547 also appears to protect the creditor if perfection
occurs after the bankruptcy petition is filed but within the ten day
grace period because the time of transfer remains the time of
attachment. 1 6 Suppose D grants the bank a security interest on
May 1. On May 5 the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy. The
bank perfects the security interest on May 10. At first glance this
may appear to be a preferential transfer, but section 547 provides
otherwise. Because the transfer was perfected within ten days of the
date of attachment, the perfection relates back to the date of
attachment. The trustee cannot establish the antecedent debt
element because, for purposes of section 547, the debt and the
transfer arose simultaneously.
C.

PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS AND SECTION

547

OF

THE BANKRUPTCY ACT

Section 547 eliminates the second problem created by the
interaction between section 60 and Article 9: the tendency to favor
nonpurchase money security interests over purchase money
security interests. 1 7 Under section 547(e)(2) state law grace periods
114. Id. 5 547(e)(2)(A).
115. Id. § 547(e)(2)(B).
116. W. COLLIER, supra note 104,

547.45, at 547-135. One commentator concludes:

If the ten-day period for perfection has not yet expired when the petition is filed, it can
still be utilized to relate back to the actual time of transfer. In other words, if the
petition is filed a week after a transfer was made, three days are still left to perfect it
and the automatic stay should not apply to depart from the intent of the statute in this
regard.
Id. See also Hogan, supra note 104, at 48 ("Section 547(e)(2)(C) clearly authorizes a filing after
bankruptcy and within the 10 day zone for transactions on the eve of bankruptcy. ").
117. For a discussion of the interaction between 5 60 and purchase tmoney security interests, see
supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
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are irrelevant. 118 Section 547(e)(2) treats these two security
ihterests equally by not employing state law to establish the time of
the transfer. The ten day grace period under section 547(e)(2) is
applied to all transfers.'" 9 Because this equal treatment violates the
Code's policy of favoring purchase money security interests, the
drafters of section 547 provided an exemption for certain transfers
under section 547(c)(3).1 20 This section protects the creditor's
security interest when value is given to the debtor after the signing
of the security agreement. The transaction, however, must meet
several requirements. The value must be given to enable the debtor
to acquire the collateral and the debtor must in fact use the value to
acquire this collateral. Additionally, the creditor must perfect the
security interest within ten days of attachment. 12'
This provision closely parallels section 9-107 of Article 9. In
most situations section 547(c)(3) will protect purchase money
security interests from a preference attack. 22 Generally, the
secured party will file within ten days and meet the requirements of
section 547(c)(3). Because of the parallel protection under section
9-107 of the Code, section 547(c)(3) seems to add little to the
protection offered by section 547(e)(2).1 23 In certain situations,
however, section 547(c)(3) will not protect the purchase money
lender. Section 547(e)(3) states that a transfer cannot occur until
the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. 24 Section 547(e)(2),
therefore, would not protect a purchase money lender if the debtor
118. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 381.
119. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 380.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 547(c)(3) states:
[A] trustee may not avoid . . . a transfer . . . of a security interest in property
acquired by the debtor (A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was (i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a
description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest attaches.
Id.
121. Id. § 547(c)(3)(B). The phrase "perfetedt
before 10 days" of section 547(c)(3)(B) has been
interpreted literally by at least one commentator. Prolessor Hogan has noted that "if the security
interest attaches on January 2, 10 days after that date will be January 12: but perfection must occur
onjanuary 11 to qualify the perfection as beforeJanuary 12." Hogan, supra note 104, at 47 (emphasis
added).
122. WHIrTE& SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 1006-07.
123. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 1006-07. Professors White and Summers note that
"[blecause of the ten day grace period in subsection (e), it will seldom be necessary for even a
purchase money lender to invoke this exception. Normally he will protect himselfby filing within ten
days of the time the security agreement is signed." Id.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). According to § 547(e)(3) "a transfer is not made
until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred." Id.
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acquires rights in the collateral after completion of the security
agreement because the transfer would be for an antecedent debt.
Professors White and Summers illustrated the problems as follows:
Assume for example that a bank agrees to lend a million
dollars to debtor for the debtor's purchase of some
expensive equipment. The parties sign the security
agreement and the loan is made on day one but the
collateral is not actually purchased until day 30 and the
filing is not made until day 31. But for the purchase
money exception, that transaction could be attacked as a
voidable preference notwithstanding the ten day grace
period. Since no transfer can occur until the debtor
acquires rights in the collateral and since the debtor
acquired such rights only on the 30th day, the transfer
would be for the antecedent debt that had arisen on day
one. Subsection 547(c)(3) will save that transaction; the
ten day relation back rule would not save it. 125
In sum, the revision of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act has
resolved one of the interpretative difficulties created by the section
60 interaction with Article 9. Security interests perfected within ten
days of attachment will not be attacked as preferential.
Furthermore, section 547 extends the ten day protection to all
transactions, including purchase and nonpurchase money security
interests. Although this violates the Code's policy of encouraging
advance filing, 126 some clarity has nevertheless been achieved. This
"clarity is often more valuable than case-by-case justice, and in
bringing some certainty to this area section 547's drafters have
127
performed a signal service for commercial lawyers."
V. EXTENSION OF THE TIME PERIOD FOR PERFECTION
A.

THE EFFECT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA AMENDMENT

In 1981 the North Dakota Legislature amended subsection 2
125. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 1007. Professor Hogan noted:

[T]he careful secured party may simply contract to make the transfer take effect at the
time of delivery and thus get the full 10 days recognized in Bankruptcy. The
Bankruptcy Act should simply measure the ten day period in purchase money cases
from the time ofdelivery of the goods.
HOGAN, supra note 104, at 46.

126. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 382.
127. Mann & Phillips, supra note 61, at 382.
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of section 41-09-22 of the North Dakota Century Code.1 28 The
amendment extended the ten day grace period for perfecting a
purchase money security interest to twenty days. 1 29 This extension
creates a potential conflict with section 547 of the Bankruptcy Act.
As discussed above, the time of transfer is important in
determining whether a transfer is preferential. 30 Assume on May 1
a seller retains a purchase money security interest in equipment
sold to a buyer. The parties sign a security agreement and the
debtor receives possession of the equipment also on May 1. On
May 15 a financing statement covering the equipment is filed in the
appropriate office. On June 1 the buyer files a petition in
bankruptcy, within ninety days of the transfer. In this example the
security interest attaches and becomes enforceable under state law
on May 1.131 The security interest is perfected on May 15 when the
financing statement is filed. 1 32 The granting of the security interest,
however, is a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. 133
Therefore, the critical bankruptcy question is when did the transfer
occur. In this hypothetical the transfer takes effect on May 1, the
date the security interest attaches and becomes enforceable.
However, because perfection occurred more than ten days after the
transfer took effect, May 15, the "relation-back" rule of section
547(e)(2)(A) does not apply. Rather, section 547(e)(2)(B) applies.
Under section 547(e)(2)(B) the transfer is deemed to occur on May
15, the date when perfection took place. In this example the date of
perfection is deemed the date of transfer. Therefore, the transfer is
for or on account of an antecedent debt. Assuming the other
elements of a preferential transfer are present, 34 the trustee may
avoid the purchase money security interest, even though the seller
filed the financing statement within the twenty day grace period of
section 41-09-22(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. The

128. Act of March 11, 1981, ch. 432, § 1, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 1202 (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE 541-09-22(2) (Supp. 1981)).
129. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-22(2) (Supp. 1981). Section 41-09-22(2) provides as follows:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before or

within twenty days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority
over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the time
the security interest attaches and the time of filing.

Id. (emphasis added).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2). See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
131. U.C.C. 5 9-203(1), (2) (1978). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-16(2) (Supp. 1981).
132. U.C.C. §5 9-302(1),
9-303(1).
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(4 0)(Supp. IV 1980).
134. For a discussion of the elements of a preferential transfer, see supra notes 89-104 and
accompanying text.
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exemption of section 547(c)(3) would not protect the security
interest because perfection did not occur within ten days after the
3 5
security interest attached.
A second hypothetical further illustrates the difficulty. Assume
on August 1 the seller retains a purchase money security interest in
equipment sold to the buyer and the parties sign a security
agreement. The buyer receives possession of the equipment on
September 1. On September 15 the seller appropriately files a
financing statement. On October 1 the buyer files a bankruptcy
petition, within ninety days of the transfer. Under the North
Dakota amendment to section 41-09-22(2) perfection occurred
within the twenty day grace period. 1 36 Therefore, under the
"relation-back"
rule the transfer would have occurred on
September 1, the date the buyer took possession. Under section
547(e)(2)(B), however, the transfer occurred on September 15
because perfection occurred more than ten days after the transfer
took effect on August 1. The trustee may avoid the transfer of the
137
security interest because it is on account of an antecedent debt.
As the two hypotheticals illustrate, section 41-09-22(2)
presents two traps for the purchase money lender. The security
interest can be avoided as a preferential transfer under section 547
in either of the following situations: (1) when attachment and the
buyer's receipt of possession occur simultaneously but perfection
occurs more than ten days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral (the first hypothetical); or (2) when attachment of the
security interest occurs before the buyer takes possession of the
collateral and perfection is delayed more than ten days after
attachment (the second hypothetical).
B. THE NORTH DAKOTA AMENDMENT AND SECTION 544
The most commonly used avoidance powers of the trustee are
those contained in section 544 of the Bankruptcy Act. 138 Section
544(a) gives the trustee all the rights under state law of a
39
hypothetical creditor with a lien on property of the debtor.
135. For a discussion of the operation of § 547(c)(3), see supra notes 120-25 and accompanying
text.

136. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-22(2). The seller's security interest was perfected on
September 15, the date the financing statement was filed. Because this filing occurred within 20 days
of the date the debtor received possession of the collateral, September 1, the seller perfected within
the grace period of§ 41-09-22(2).

137. See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2)(Supp. IV 1980).
138. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 996. Professors White and Summers have noted
that "[b]y far the most common and simple clash is between the bankruptcy trustee and the Article 9
claimant who either fails to perfect at all or lets his perfection lapse." Id.
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 544(a) is commonly referred to as the "strong
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Assuming the relevant state law is Article 9, the relevant provision
is section 9-301(1)(b), which gives priority to a creditor who obtains
a lien on property of the debtor during the time a security interest
in the same property is unperfected. 140 Accordingly, under the
terms of section 544(a) the bankruptcy trustee may assert the rights
14 1
of a hypothetical creditor under section 9-301(1)(b).
Consequently, the trustee will prevail over most Article 9 claimants
whose interests are not perfected at the date the petition is filed.
The trustee's powers under section 544 are limited, however,
by section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. 142 Under section 546(b), if
an interest holder at the date of bankruptcy still has the opportunity
to perfect his interest against an intervening creditor under
applicable state law, the interest holder may perfect against the
trustee.143 This section allows a secured party who is unperfected at
the date of bankruptcy to perfect his security interest if the state
grace period for filing has not yet expired. Section 9-301(2) is a
"generally applicable law" under section 546(b).144 In this case the
North Dakota amendment to section 9-301(2), section 41-09-22(2),
does not appear to create a problem. The purchase money lender
may perfect within the twenty day period and withstand the
1 45
trustee's attack under section 544(a).
As discussed above, a purchase money lender may be
arm clause." S. REP. No. 989, supra Note 90, at 85, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 5871. Section

544(a) provides as follows:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to any
knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is
voidable by (1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a
judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have
obtained ajudicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;

11 U.S.C. §544(a).
140. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978). Section 9-301(1)(b) states that "an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected." Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §41-09-22(1)(b) (1981).
141. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 997-98.

142. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (Supp. IV 1980). The relevant portion of § 546(b) states that "ft]he
rights and powers of the trustee under section 544, 545, or 549 of this title are subject to any generalby
applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that
acquires rights in such property before the date ofsuch perfection." Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 90, at 86, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5872. The phrase

"generally applicable law" refers to laws that apply both in bankruptcy and outside of bankruptcy.
Id. The legislative history of § 546(b) specifically mentions 5 9-301(2) of the U.C.C. as an example of
generally applicable law. Id.
145. The legislative history of § 544(a) contains a specific approval of the Code purchase money
rule in this context. The report, however, refers specifically to the uniform 10 day period. The House

1983]

NOTE

unperfected at the time the petition is filed and yet defeat the
trustee's powers under the preference provisions of section 547.146
This result also is possible under section 544(a). Normally the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy acts as a stay of various actions against
the debtor. 147 To the extent the trustee is subject to section 546(b),
however, the filing of a petition does not operate as a stay of an act
of perfection. 148 Assume a secured creditor makes a purchase
money loan to the debtor on July 1. On July 3 the debtor files the
bankruptcy petition. The creditor perfects the security interest on
July 7. Under section 9-301(2) the creditor's security interest would
relate back to July 1 and take priority over a lien creditor whose
interests intervene between the taking of the security interest and
the filing of the financing statement. Because 544(a) gives the
trustee the rights a lien creditor would have under state law, the
trustee may not successfully attack the security interest. The North
Dakota amendment to section 9-301(2) does not appear to change
the result under section 544(a).
Although the recent North Dakota amendment does not seem
to create difficulties under section 544, the problems under section
547 cannot be ignored. 149 A great potential exists for confusion
about the interaction between section 41-09-22(2), as amended,
and section 547. According to the session laws, the bill to amend

report states:
[Miany State laws, under the Uniform Commercial Code, permit perfection of a
purchase-money security interest to relate back to defeat an earlier perfected nonpurchase-money security interest if the former was perfected within ten days. U.C.C.
section 9-301(2). Such perfection would then be able to defeat a hypothetical judicial
lien creditor on the date of the filing of the petition. The purpose of the subsection is to
protect, in spite of the surprise intervention of bankruptcy petition, those whom State
law protects by allowing them to perfect their liens or interests as of an effective date
that is earlier than the date of perfection.
H. R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
5963, 6327.
146. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
148. Id. § 362(b)(3). Section 362(b)(3) provides:

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws

(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title does not
operate as a stay (3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to
perfection under section 546(b) of this title.
Id. Although the secured party filing after bankruptcy pursuant to § 546(b) is specifically excepted
under § 362(b)(3), no corresponding exception exists in the Bankruptcy Act for § 547(e)(2)(C).
Hogan, supra note 104, at 43 n.23.
149. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 999. Professors White and Summers state that while
"the trustee will find as many opportunities for the use of section 547 as he will for section 544,
section 547 is at least as important to a lawyer." Id.
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section 41-09-22(2) was introduced by the Committee on Industry,
Business, and Labor at the request of the Secretary of State. 150 The
Secretary of State explained that the bill "merely changes from 10
days to 20 days, the reason being they (creditors) cannot get the
filing done in time between the creditor and the debtor. As an
example ... the creditor may be in North Dakota and the debtor is
in Chicago. It will give them more time to get the paper work back
and forth." 15 1 This appears to have been the extent of the
discussion about the bill.
C.

THE EXTENSION OF THE TIME PERIOD IN OTHER STATES

North Dakota, however, is not alone in extending the grace
period for purchase money security interests. Other states that have
15 2
amended section 9-301(2) include the following: Alabama,
153
Georgia,
Illinois, 154 Iowa, 155 Maine, 156 Montana,15 7 North
15
8
Carolina,
South Carolina, 15 9 Tennessee, 160 Texas, 16 1 and
162
Wisconsin.
The general rationale is that more time is needed for
filing because of delays caused by transit in the mails. 163
A recent case discussed the effect of the Tennessee filing time
extension. In Jahn v. First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In re
Burnette)164 the court held that a security interest perfected within
the ninety day preference period and within the twenty day
165
perfection period was not preferential.
On November 14, 1980, the debtor, Burnette, purchased a
truck from a dealer on credit and received possession of the
truck. 166 The dealer assigned its security interest to the defendant
bank. Twenty days after the sale, December 4, 1980, the bank filed
150. Act ofMarch 11, 1981, ch. 432, § 1, 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 1202.
151. Hearing on S.B. No. 2115 Before the Committee on Industry, Business, &Labor, 47th Leg. Sess.
(1981) (statement of Ben Meier, Secretary ofState).
152. ALA.CODE § 7-9-301(2) (Supp. 1981) (20 days).
153. GA. CODE § 109A-9-301-(2) (Supp. 1981) (15 days).
154. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-301(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83) (20 days).
155. IowA CODE ANN. § 554.9301(2) (West Supp. 1982-83) (20 days).
156. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-301(2) (Supp. 1982-83) (20 days).
157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-301(2) (1981) (20 days).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-301(2) (Supp. 1981) (20 days).
159. S. C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-301(2)(Supp. 1982) (20 days).
160. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-301(2) (1979 & Supp. 1982) (20 days).
161. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9-301(b) (Supp. 1981) (20 days).

162. Wis. STAT. ANN. §409.301(2) (West Supp. 1981-82) (20 days).
163. COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 72, § 9C.06(e), at 410 (Supp. 1982).

164. 14 Bankr. 795 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
165. Jahn v. First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In re BurAette), 14 Bankr. 795, 802 (E.D.
Tenn. 1981).
166. Id. at 796.
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an application for a certificate of title noting its lien.1 67 The debtor
filed a petition in bankruptcy on February 11, 1981, and the
bankruptcy trustee brought suit to avoid the bank's security
interest in the truck. 168 The trustee argued that a preferential
transfer had occurred because perfection took place twenty days
after the security interest was transferred.1 69 The bank, on the other
hand, argued that under Tennessee law its security interest was
"continuously perfected" from the time of the sale. 170 The issue
was whether the transfer was for or on account of an antecedent
debt. 171
To determine whether antecedency existed, the court had to
resolve the conflict between the twenty day grace period of section
47-9-301(2) of the Tennessee Code 7 2 and the ten day grace period
of section 547 of the Bankruptcy Act. The court dismissed the
trustee's argument that the state grace period was irrelevant
because the federal preference statute was controlling. 73 The court
found that a reference to state law is required under the preference
174
statute to determine when a transfer is perfected.
The court examined the legislative history of section 547 and
admitted that "Congress intended for ten days to be a uniform
grace period."1 75 The court noted that section 60, the forerunner of
section 547, made state grace periods expressly relevant. These
state grace periods, however, created problems. 7 6 Therefore, the
court reasoned that Congress desired to eliminate the problems by
167. Id. The court found that the bank's security interest was perfected when this application
was filed. Id.

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. According to the bank, no preferential transfer existed. Because perfection occurred
within the twenty day grace period of the Tennessee Code, the bank argued that its security interest
was perfected from the time of attachment. The bank claimed that its security interest was perfected
under both state law and the definition of perfection in the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 802.
171. Id. at 796. The court found that the other elements of a preferential transfer were satisfied.

Il

172. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-301(2) (1979 & Supp. 1982). Section 47-9-301(2) provides in
part:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before or
within twenty (20) days after the collateral comes into the possession of the debtor, he
takes priority over the rights of. . . a lien creditor which arise between the time the
security interest attaches and the time of filing.
1d. (emphasis added). Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-22(2) (Supp. 1981), which also provides a
20 day grace period.
173. 14 Bankr. at 801. The court concluded, however, that "Congress did not intend for state
grace periods to be relevant under the preference statute." Id.
174. Id.

175. Id. The court recognized this intent several times throughout the opinion: "The idea was
that the preference statute should establish a uniform grace period." Id. at 798-99. Again, the court
noted that "Congress set the grace period at ten days, apparently so that the preference statute
would treat secured creditors the same as state law." Id. at 800.
176. For a discussion of the problems created by state grace periods, see supra notes 66-77 and
accompanying text.
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subordinating state grace periods to section 547.177 The court found
that when Congress intended for grace periods to limit the trustee's
powers, Congress expressly provided for these limits. As an
example of this congressional intent, the court discussed the limits
sections 546(b) and 362(b)(3) place on the trustee's powers under
section 544(a). 178 The court concluded:
It is evident that Congress did not intend for state
grace periods to be relevant under the preference statute.
There was to be a uniform rule throughout the nation. In
any jurisdiction, a transferee was to have only ten days to
perfect a transfer and thereby avoid the antecedent debt
problem. Ten days was picked apparently because it
corresponded to state law, but Congress did not
79
specifically refer to grace periods under state law. 1
Thus, the court recognized that Congress intended the ten
days to be a uniform rule, but nevertheless stated that the definition
of perfection was to be interpreted in a manner most appropriate to
its wording. 180 According to the Gilmore Committee definition,
perfection cannot occur until "(1) any act required of perfection
(e.g. filing) has been accomplished and (2) 'an interest in property'
has been transferred.1" The court stated that this definition
should mean that Article 9 security interests "are perfected at the
moment when the last event required for perfection under Article 9
182
occurs."
The court found, however, that this definition of perfection
could be interpreted in two ways, depending on the tense of the
definition. 183 Under the first interpretation the court examined the
statement "[a] security interest 'is perfected' when a creditor
'cannot' acquire a superior judicial lien.' '184 When perfection is
used in this tense, the court found that it must look at the facts at
any moment in time. The court posed the following hypothetical:
Suppose that a bank has a purchase money security
interest that it has not filed to perfect, but the twenty day
177. 14 Bankr. at 801. The court found that Congress could have followed the example set by

5 60 if Congress had wished state grace periods to be relevant under 5 547. Id. at 800.
178. Id. at 800. For a discussion of the limits on the trustee's powers, see supra notes 116-25
and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 801.
180. Id. at 801.
181. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 209, 218-19 (1977)).
182.14 Bankr. at 802.
183. Id. at 801-02.
184. Id. at 801.
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grace period has not expired. During the grace period and
before the bank files, a creditor can possibly acquire a
superior judicial lien. That depends on whether the bank
actually does file within the grace period. If the bank
does, then its security interest will have priority because
its perfection will relate back to when the security interest
attached, before the creditor acquired the judicial lien.
But from the creditor's perspective, it could. not know
what was going to happen when it acquired its judicial

lien. 185
The court found this interpretation of "perfection" to be
consistent with congressional intent because perfection cannot
occur until the last event required for perfection occurs. 186 The
court stated, however, that this approach strained the wording of
facts
the definition because a court is required "to consider the
18 7
from an earlier perspective, rather than as they turned out."
Because this interpretation was strained, the court chose a
second approach. The court found that the best approach was to
view the definition of perfection as referring to a period of time
rather than a moment in time. The court stated "the definition
means a security interest is perfected during any period of time
when a creditor cannot acquire a superior judicial lien. The period
of time can begin before the last step necessary for perfection
occurs." 188
The court found this approach more reasonable because it was
"less troublesome," even though the first interpretation agreed
with the congressional intent. 189 Because the court chose the second
interpretation of "perfection," the court held that the bank was
"continuously perfected" during both the twenty day and the ten
day grace period of the preference statute. 190 As a result the bank's
security interest was "perfected from the time it attached, both
under state law and under the definition of perfection in the
preference statute. There was no transfer on account of an
antecedent debt." 19 1
Several observations should be made about the court's
conclusion that the transfer was not for an antecedent debt. The
185. Id.
186. Id

187. Id.
188. Id. The court noted that the words "perfection" and "perfected" have a dual meaning.
Id. n.7. The court stated that "[t]hey describe the act of perfecting a security interest or its state of
being perfected." Id.
189. Id. at 801.
190. Id. at 802.
191. Id. The court also held that the transfer was substantially contemporaneous within the
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court is correct in stating that the bank's security interest was
perfected on December 4, the day the bank filed an application for
a certificate of title with its lien noted. Because this filing occurred
during the twenty day period, between November 14 and
December 4, no "creditor . . . [could] acquire a judicial lien ...
superior to the interest of the transferee," the bank. 192 Under the
Tennessee Code the bank was continuously perfected. The
importance, however, of sections 547(e)(1) and (2) for purposes of
antecedency is two-fold: section 547(e)(1) defines perfection and
section 547(e)(2) specifically provides rules for determining when a
transfer occurs. Because perfection is referred to in section
547(e)(2) only to fix the date of transfer, the single question left to
193
state law is what acts constitute perfection.
The bank argued that it was perfected during both the twenty
day period and the ten day period. 194 This argument presents no
conflict with section 547. It does not, however, resolve the issue of
antecedency, because the date of the transfer is necessary to
determine antecedency. The general rule is that a transfer is made
at the time it is perfected. 195 The exception to this general rule is
that if a transfer is perfected within ten days of attachment of the
196
security interest, the date of attachment is the date of transfer.
Section 547(e)(2) does not state that if a transfer is continuously
perfected during the ten days after the transfer, then perfection is
deemed to occur at the time of the transfer.
The court's reasoning appears to be that because the bank was
perfected from the time the security interest attached on November
meaning of 11 U.S.C. 9 547(c)(1) and therefore, the transfer was not preferential. Id. at 802-03. The
court recognized that § 547(c)(1) was not meant to apply to credit situations. Id. at 802. The court
found, however, that the exception was broad enough to encompass the case before it because the 20
day grace period provided "a good indication of what should be expected of secured parties." Id. at
803. But see Exchange Bank of Polk County v. Christian (In re Christian), 8 Bankr. 816, 819 (M.D.
Fla. 1981) ("[T~he first exception to the Trustee's voiding power... dealing with contemporaneous
transactions is not applicable to situations involving security interests.").
192. 11 U.S.C. 5 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
193. W. COLLIER, supra note 104, 1547.46, at 547-136.1. This perfection concept is emphasized
in the following discussion of which law governs in bankruptcy:
The idea of supremacy of state law is confined to the field just discussed, i.e., what
constitutes perfection of a transfer. The question of whether the transfer is preferential
and avoidable by the trustee is governed by section 547. Thus a state rule that a
creditor may be preferred and if able to obtain the property before its seizure under
process, can hold it for his debt, must yield to the provisions of section 547. What
constitutes the general frame work of section 547 is a federal question, whether
presented in a state or federal court, upon which the United States Supreme Court is
the final arbiter.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
194. 14 Bankr. at 797.
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of the timing provisions of
section 547, see supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2).
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14, under section 547(e)(2) the transfer was not on account of an
antecedent debt. The court does not clearly address the issue of
when the transfer occurred. Under section 547(e)(2)(B) the transfer
did not occur on November 14, but rather on December 4, the date
of perfection. 1 97 The debt arose on November 14 and therefore, the
transfer on December 4 was "for or on account of an antecendent
198
debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made. ,
The determination of when a transfer is perfected and what
acts constitute perfection under section 547(e) depend on state
law. 1 99 The relevance of state law, however, is limited to this
area. 200 The Bankruptcy Act governs what acts constitute a
transfer, when a transfer occurs, whether a transfer is preferential,
and whether the trustee may avoid the transfer. 20 1 The result
reached in Jahn is contrary to this principle. The holding ignores
the congressional intent of preempting state grace periods in
preference cases. 20 2 The effect of the decision is to subject the
Bankruptcy Act to the variances of state law.
Conversely, the Code itself recognizes the preeminence of
federal law. Section 9-104(a) states that "[t]his Article does not
apply ... to a security interest subject to any statute of the United
States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to
and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of
property.' '203 The Bankruptcy Act is clearly a statute of the United
197. Id. § 547(e)(2)(B). According to S 547(e)(2)(B) a transfer perfected after 10 days of the date
ofattachment is deemed to occur on the date of perfection. Id.
198. Id. 5 547(b)(2).
199. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
200. See Furedy v. Appleman (In re Vodco Volume Development Co., Inc.), 567 F.2d 967 (10th
Cir. 1977). In Appleman the court concluded that "although the procedureto be followed in perfecting a
security interest in the property of a bankrupt is determined in accordance with state law, the time at
which 'perfection' becomes effective against the trustee in bankruptcy is determined by federal law."
567 F.2d at 970. (emphasis in original). See also E. F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826, 830 (10th Cir.
1974) (time of transfer is determined by federal law, but state law determines the perfection); Selby
v. Ford Motor Co., 405 F. Supp. 164, 170 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (when a transfer is perfected depends
upon State law); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc. (In re Ken Gardner Ford
Sales, Inc.), 10 Bankr. 632, 643 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (perfection relates back only as allowed by the
preference statute); Palmer v. Morford (Matter ofCanup Mechanical, Inc.), 1 Bankr. 703, 704 (M.D.
Fla. 1979) (perfection of an interest in bankrupt property is determined by state law; time of the
transfer is determined by federal law).
201. W. COLLIER, supra note 104, 547.46, at 547-136.1. Collier illustrates the supremacy of the
federal Bankruptcy Act in the following example:
In State B, assume that recording is required, but that this may be done within
thirty days, or within a "reasonable time," or that no time limit is fixed. Here, if the
security interest is recorded within ten days after it was given, it will not be treated as a
transfer for an antecedent debt, but if recording is delayed beyond that time (even
though effected within the thirty days allowed by state law), its preferential character
will be judged as of the recording date, and the debt will be antecedent.
Id. at 547-136.3-.4.
202. Although the court expressly recognizes the intent of Congress, the court makes no attempt
to reconcile its holding with this intent. The court merely states that its approach "is less
troublesome than the interpretation that agrees with Congress's [sic] intent."Jahn, 14 Bankr. at 802.
203. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1978). The comment to § 9-104 expands upon the concept of federal
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States which governs the rights of such parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately the Jahn case is the only reported case dealing
with the conflict between the ten day period of section 547(e)(2)(A)
and the twenty day period of section 9-301(2), as amended.
Therefore, it is difficult to speculate what other courts will decide
when presented with the issue. Considering the intent of Congress
in enacting section 547 and the problems with the twenty day
provision, the courts should follow the principle of federal
supremacy. While the new Bankruptcy Act has not solved all the
problems of interaction with the Uniform Commercial Code, a
204
certain consistency has been achieved.
Because of the uncertainty which now exists, secured creditors
should perfect security interests within ten days and ignore the
twenty day amendments. As noted by Professor Krahmer, since
"the gift of prescience is not common among secured creditors, a
debtor's future bankruptcy should always be considered a potential
risk, and filing within ten instead of twenty days is a virtually cost
free means of avoiding a substantial part of that risk. "205 In the
meantime other state legislatures should not extend the filing
,period beyond the uniform ten day period. Those states that have
done so already should consider returning to the uniform ten day
06
period to avoid wasteful and costly litigation. 2
PAMELA A. DUGGER
supremacy. Comment I states that "[w]here a federal statute regulates the incidents of security
interests in particular types of property, those security interests are of course governed by the federal
statute and excluded from this Article." Id., Comment 1.
204. For discussions of some problem areas that still exist, see Hogan, supra note 104;
Mann & Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. An Imperfect Resolution of the Conflict Between
the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ. 239 (1980); Mann &Phillips, The
Reclaiming Seller Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act: Resolution or Renewal of an Old Conflict?, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (1980); Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the Code, 17 Hous.
L. REv. 289 (1980).

205. Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 34 S.W. L.J. 199, 222 (1980). See also Walker, Creation,
Perfection, & Enforcement of Security Interests Under the "Tennessee" Commercial Code, 48 TENN. L. REv.
819, 926 (1981) ("A creditor would be well advised to perfect a security interest within ten days of the
transfer regardless of state law.").
206. In February 1983 Representative Glenn Pomeroy introduced a bill to amend 5 41-09-22(2)
of the North Dakota Century Code. H.B. 1609, 48th Leg., Sess. (1983). The purpose of the bill was
to change the 20 day grace period back to 10 days. Id. During discussion of the bill Representative
Pomeroy noted the potential problems the current 20 day period presents. Hearing on H.B. No. 1609
Before the Committee on Industry, Business & Labor, 48th Leg. Sess. (1983). Tom Kelsh of the North
Dakota Bankers Association stated that the 20 day period creates a trap for the unwary. Id. In
response to the question of whether any bankers had complained about the 20 day period, Mr. Kelsh
responded no. Id. A motion to do not pass the bill was made by Representative Elmer Retzer. This
motion was carried by a vote of 12 yes and 4 no. On February 9, 1983, House Bill 1609 was voted on
by the House of Representatives. N.D. H. JoUR., Feb. 9, 1983, at 875. The final vote was 52 yeas,
51 nays, 3 absent and not voting. Id. The bill was declared lost for lack of a constitutional majority.
Id. at 876. Therefore, the grace period for filing purchase money security interests in North Dakota is
still 20 days.

